Governance: Bicameralism and Unicameralism

By David R. Berman, senior research fellow

Arizona’s founding fathers opted for the traditional bicameral (two house) legislature. But not long after statehood, at the urging of Arizona’s first governor, George W.P. Hunt, legislators gave serious consideration to abolishing the Senate and moving to a unicameral system.

In the second legislative session in 1912 a bill to abolish the Senate actually passed that body but died in the House. Proponents contended that two houses instead of one got in the way of democracy, making it easier for the special interests to block legislation favored by the majority of the people. The idea also appealed to some legislators on the grounds that having two houses was needless and added unnecessary duplication expenses. The idea of abolishing the Senate surfaced again as a ballot proposal in 1916, which was rejected by voters.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s “one person one vote” decision in 1964 rekindled the historic disputes between proponents of bicameralism and unicameralism. Reformers argued that the chief function performed by having two houses was the representation of both area (counties) and population. Now that both houses must be based on populations, they contended, bicameralism was a costly and inefficient anachronism that owed its continued existence largely to inertia and tradition.

Over the years those favoring unicameralism have contend that having only one house would enhance legislative responsibility, reduce the influence of interest groups, promote economy and efficiency, and, coupled with other reforms, produce better legislative personnel. With one house, there would be no more buck-passing (blaming the other house or a conference committee for the failure to take action or for the action taken). Time could be saved by eliminating the conference stage and avoiding duplicate hearings and procedures. Money could be saved by speeding the process and, because the adoption of the plan would normally bring a severe reduction in legislative offices, savings would come in the form of legislative salaries. The influence of interest groups presumably would diminish because there would be fewer points of access and because the public’s attention would be better focused on a smaller legislative body. The legislature, supporters claim, would become not only more transparent but also more prestigious, increasing competition for office and thus enhancing the chances of securing the cream of the crop.

Theoretically, a small, unicameral legislature may be more conducive to a system wherein the legislature sits primarily as an operating board whose chief task is to render services as quickly and as efficiently as possible. This type of legislative body is widely popular in city governments, particularly those under the council-manager form, where emphasis is placed on the need to provide services in a businesslike manner.  

On the other hand, a two-house legislature, or at least a large one-house legislature, is more conducive to a system in which the legislature plays a more deliberative function and is expected to represent a highly heterogeneous population. Defenders of bicameralism argue, moreover, that even though both houses must be based on the same population principle, two houses perform a valuable checks-and-balances function, providing extra “eyes” for legislation and more deliberation, thus preventing hasty legislation.

Unicameralism has been tested in only a few states and with inconclusive results. In Nevada adoption of a unicameral system in 1934 appears to have reduced the costs of lawmaking without leading to what might be called “hasty” legislation. Citizen approval of the legislature’s performance has been comparable to that of approval rates in other states.  The small size of the legislature (49 members) appears to have improved openness and enabled more legislators to get actively involved in decision making.  (Note 1) Still, politics in Nebraska seems to be relatively low-pressured and the experiment may not be transferable to larger and more heterogeneous states.